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The US Campaign Against Terrorism: Insights from the Arab World
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uploaded : Wednesday 27th Feb 2002 at 12:40 |
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by : Dr Ziad Asali |
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The U.S. Campaign against terrorism:
Insights from the Arab World
Address by Dr. Ziad Asali
President, ADC
Given on February 19th, 2002 at the Middle East Institute
The history making, and policy defining, tragic events of September 11 have clearly had a more profound impact on the USA and the Arab Islamic World than on the rest of the world. The war on terrorism in Afghanistan is the first phase of a long, opaque and complex course of events that will define international relations for decades to come.
The Arab World is a huge stretch of land, with a most variegated population of over a quarter of a billion people, living in 25 States. It is part of the Islamic World that is populated by 1.2 billion people living in 55 States. No person in his right mind can make a generalization about the perceptions, policies and actions of such a large mass of humanity. I will, however, try to offer some insights, focus some attention on lurking dangers, and hope to explore some avenues that might help lead us out of the present predicament.
There is no historical precedent in the US for September 11. Pearl Harbor was directed against men in uniform. There is no exaggeration of the sense of violation and outrage of the American citizen after this crime, and all of us in this room will live with its consequences on the life of the nation and the world.
On September 11, four weeks after I assumed the presidency of the largest Arab- American grass roots organization, I found my organization and my community instantly in the eye of the storm. In another speech, on a different occasion, I would tell you about the sense of the Arab American community in this country after having visited 11 different cities to read it. In one word, that sense is of vulnerability.
I also visited the Arab World, crossing the Atlantic twice and visiting three different countries in the past few months. I talked to senior officials, journalists, academics and business people, watched TV, read the papers and participated in seminars. However, in order to make contact with the class that is not present at the discourse of the privileged, I took many cab rides, had my shoes shined repeatedly, and had haircuts. I asked questions and listened to people who provided these services. It is this part of my conversations that I found most interesting and most problematic.
The Arab people feel victimized, deprived of political, economic, cultural and civic privileges that accrued to a large segment of humanity. They have a great sense of history, and take pride in their role in it, and they feel deeply the indignity of the chasm that separates their present from their past. It is fair to say that the average Arab citizen perceives his government as a corrupt system of coercion and unshared privilege. The political and business elite is generally perceived to have sold out to the West, specifically to the US, and is incapable and unwilling to defend the national interest. As for those regimes that are in opposition to the West, their failure, and the suffering of their citizenry, is a reminder to the people of the worse alternative.
The past half a century has accumulated a record of crushing military defeats of several combinations of Arab States, and witnessed civil wars that yielded nothing but misery and bitterness in several countries. The frontal challenge to the Arab body politic, that of Israel and the question of Palestine, has never been met, and has remained the primary source of hostility toward the triangle of Arab Regimes, Israel and the United States. It has festered, unresolved, and is still at the core of disaffection and potential for tragedy.
Images on Al Jazira of civilian Palestinians subjected to the might of an army using sophisticated American weapons have flashed daily across the screens of tens of millions of Arab viewers for the past seventeen months. There is no sense in divorcing this context from the reaction of the Arab people after 9/11.
Political Islam, which has flexed its muscle in Shiite Iran in 1980, and claimed a military victory for the Sunnis in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in ‘89, appealed to the sense of injured dignity of the disaffected and hopeless youth. It has since replaced socialism, secularism and Arabism as the main force of opposition to all Arab regimes, and it has found its refuge in mosques and religious schools.
For the past couple of decades, the political space in the Arab World has reflected two major forces: the regimes and their State apparatus on the one hand, and political Islamic opposition on the other. The large middle ground is occupied by marginalized and reduced sectors of the society. These include the silenced secular, educated and enlightened class, as well as working people and the unemployed who did not turn to religious opposition.
The various reactions to the war on terrorism reflect the positions, or the perceptions, of these different constituents. One thing that they seem to have in common is a sense of bewilderment. This applies across the board to the regimes, the Islamic opposition and the silent majority and its constituents.
The regimes were initially bewildered at the audacity of the attack and the astounding failure of their most intrusive intelligence services. They are now bewildered to witness the relentless campaign in the American media against regimes friendly to America in the Arab World, blaming them for creating failed systems. These systems are accused of contributing to the insecurity rather than the security of the United States. The regimes feel that this campaign against them is orchestrated by pro- Israeli elements in the media and the Administration, anxious to deflect the blame for the anti- American feeling away from a foreign policy biased towards Israel. They view this as a serious attempt to block the pressure of these friendly regimes on the Administration to
resolve the Palestinian issue, and remove the central source of dissatisfaction amongst their own people.
Most of the regimes, from Egypt to Syria, and Yemen to Tunis, have long considered political Islam as a major security threat and have not worried much about the PR impact of their ruthless confrontation with it. The Saudis had tried to co-opt it as they exaggerated their adherence to Islamic strictures in order to blunt its impact. The new war on terrorism gets genuine and substantive support across the board from the regimes, as it presents serious public relations problems, to some more than others. There is cause for concern that some in those regimes may view the whole set of events since September 11, including their strained relations with the USA, as mostly a PR challenge to be met by PR solutions. Failure to correctly assess the impact of the policies they had adopted, and the internal dynamics that have contributed to the events, will preclude the emergence of measures needed to remold the systems.
The Islamists, after their initial flush of triumph and defiance, were bewildered at the quick disintegration of their power base in Afghanistan, the lack of support for their position, and the relentless dismantling of their global operations. Their vision to replace the existing nation state system by a single powerful Islamic state, that reclaims the glories of days gone by, laid in ruin. Their hopes, as expressed by Bin Laden, were to arouse Muslims against Christians and Jews whom he called infidels in direct contradiction to Islamic texts and tradition. This call failed to resonate in a culture that, despite contemporary wisdom of "experts" and pundits, has a long history of pluralism, tolerance and coexistence, and is resisting the pressure of
holy warriors. Their posing as champions of the Arab World's motherhood and apple pie cause of Palestine, and their appeal to the sense of victimization of the people, yielded an initial sympathy by some, only to give way to the by now much practiced sense of failure, desperation and blame. The only hope they have left is for the West, by words or by deeds, to appear to wage a war on Islam and the Arabs, rather than terrorism and terrorists.
The silent majority's multiple reactions also have the same theme in common: bewilderment. Let me set aside for a moment that segment of this majority that is purposefully silenced and weakened, and talk about the wide majority that has really never had a public voice but has always had an opinion: the proverbial Arab Street. This majority had in the main never heard of Al Qaida before, could not believe that any Arab or Muslim group could in fact mount such an attack, and continued to doubt it for a long time despite glaring evidence. This majority holds some common and simple views: disdain for the regimes, animosity towards Israel, and anger at the United States for supporting Israel. They sullenly watched T.V. images flashing across their living rooms of the Israeli military destroying Palestinian lives and property, and enforcing a policy of premeditated and purposeful humiliation, with visual brutality for all to see. This spectacle of violence went on for almost a year prior to September, and it heightened all their views and sentiments sometimes to the boiling point. It is disingenuous of us to deny that some Arabs and Muslims derived and expressed satisfaction from the attack on America. However, it would be erronious to think that the majority of the Arab people did not have a genuine sense of sympathy and shared human suffering with America and its victims. This majority understood America's
reaction, and its retaliation in Afghanistan against Al Qaida and the Taliban, but is now apprehensive about the future. It has not yielded to the Crusading Jihadi concept so violently pushed by Bin Laden, but it has genuine fears that some forces in the US share his views of the clash of civilizations and religions and is afraid that they might prevail. My conversations with the working poor in several Arab capitals have convinced me that there is mistrust, almost religious, of the intentions of those who want to fight this war against terrorism. Political decisions, whose ultimate objectives have to primarily include security, have to factor in the "swing vote" of this group and see to it that is not lost. In this context it is crucial to understand that words, words that precede deeds, said by high public officials, have to be weighed with a sense of history, and with great wisdom, for their disproportionate impact at this point in time. The colonial experience, the Palestinian problem, and the long record of broken Western promises to the Arab people argue against winning over the Arab street. But it is a street that can be won over, and will respond to goodwill. Despair, at this level, cannot enhance anyone's
security.
Let me move on to that subset of the silent majority that I think is most interesting, and perhaps offers the potential for a reconstruction that might help improve the dismal reality of the Arab World, and the whole Middle East. This subset is composed primarily of the middle and upper middle class, intellectuals, academicians, professionals and business people and the like. The kind of people who had identified with Gamal Abdul Nasser's vision of a united Arab world, secular and socialist that opposed Israel and its Western benefactors. Nasser and his vision were dealt a crushing blow in 1967, and these "nationalist" forces lost out to moderate or right wing regimes that actively weakened them and propped up Islamic forces to confront and discredit them.
The story of the past several decades is one of the ascendance of the Islamist forces, their relentless march to militancy, in opposition to the regimes that nurtured them, and to the West, especially America, that initially found common cause with them. Their gains were accomplished at the expense of the Arab nationalists who lost their voice and their bearing as a coherent force. The economic failure of the socialist, or the State- sponsored, economy, with corruption playing a strategic role in impeding development, has provided a significant constituency for a free and open economic system. One of the most significant developments in my opinion in the last several decades is that this very subset of society, endowed with competence and know-how, has been calling for more freedom, accountability, transparency and enfranchisement. There is a great deal of mutual suspicion between these people and the regimes, and they have yet to reap any serious benefit from these regimes.
Building bridges between this subset and the regimes, by expanding the circle of freedom, institution building, economic reform, and accountability is the most reasonable road to development and security. It certainly would go a long way in advancing regional and global security. The regimes have to understand the value of this alliance, and have to be nudged to understand, should they seek to maintain their opacity and inertia, the need to widen their base of support and improve their performance.
The Arabs are accused of wanting to focus the discussion on "root causes" of terrorism directed against America, a code word primarily for the Palestinian problem, with the implied criticism of American foreign policy. The Western media, on the other hand, tends to look into the internal dynamics of Arab and Muslim societies, including Islam itself as a religion, to understand or explain terrorism as a phenomenon. Both approaches need to be explored with care and without polemics.
There is a very serious concern for the Palestinians in having their cause linked in the American people's mind with September 11, and this explains the initial absence of discussion on this issue. However, it remains the elephant in the middle of the room, and will need to be discussed and addressed. It is the abscess in the body of the Arab World that has festered long enough and needs to be drained. It is the single most cause of antipathy to America in the Arab and Muslim world, where America the only super power, is perceived to be a lackey of Israel. Indeed no one over there seems to understand how the US can sacrifice its own interests so readily and consistently, not just to support Israel, but to maintain Israel's conquests and settlements. Visions and solutions offered, like the one stated in the November 19th speech by Secretary Powell, seem to offer glimpses of hope of political resolve that is quick to melt away. The alleged, even acknowledged incompetence, of the Palestinian leadership cannot be accepted in the Arab World as an excuse or explanation for the political, military, economic and media support that Israel receives lavishly from the United States as it maintains its occupation of the Palestinian people. To think that this does not engender hostility towards America is a mistake.
Too many players on the local scene can exercise their veto power to block solutions. There is enough genuine and claimed sense of victimization on both sides to render it impossible to achieve a lasting peace by the local parties. For so many months now we have witnessed the downward spiral of violence exploited to create yet more grief, and to maintain the occupation. The outline for peace is known to all of us, and Secretary Powell articulated it well. The excruciatingly painful arguments and nefarious deeds that frustrate the obvious land- for- peace equation have to be confronted with political courage. The United States, the only power in a position to help resolve this conflict, and develop the needed mechanisms for implementation, has been creative in finding arguments and reasons not to close the deal. It is perhaps time to be creative in the other direction for the sake of security and peace.
In the long run the war on terrorism will be won by depriving terrorists of their most important weapons: issues.
Ziad J. Asali, MD
Tuesday, Feb 19, 2002
The U.S. Campaign against terrorism:
Insights from the Arab World
Address by Dr. Ziad Asali
President, ADC
Given on February 19th, 2002 at the Middle East Institute
The history making, and policy defining, tragic events of September 11 have clearly had a more profound impact on the USA and the Arab Islamic World than on the rest of the world. The war on terrorism in Afghanistan is the first phase of a long, opaque and complex course of events that will define international relations for decades to come.
The Arab World is a huge stretch of land, with a most variegated population of over a quarter of a billion people, living in 25 States. It is part of the Islamic World that is populated by 1.2 billion people living in 55 States. No person in his right mind can make a generalization about the perceptions, policies and actions of such a large mass of humanity. I will, however, try to offer some insights, focus some attention on lurking dangers, and hope to explore some avenues that might help lead us out of the present predicament.
There is no historical precedent in the US for September 11. Pearl Harbor was directed against men in uniform. There is no exaggeration of the sense of violation and outrage of the American citizen after this crime, and all of us in this room will live with its consequences on the life of the nation and the world.
On September 11, four weeks after I assumed the presidency of the largest Arab- American grass roots organization, I found my organization and my community instantly in the eye of the storm. In another speech, on a different occasion, I would tell you about the sense of the Arab American community in this country after having visited 11 different cities to read it. In one word, that sense is of vulnerability.
I also visited the Arab World, crossing the Atlantic twice and visiting three different countries in the past few months. I talked to senior officials, journalists, academics and business people, watched TV, read the papers and participated in seminars. However, in order to make contact with the class that is not present at the discourse of the privileged, I took many cab rides, had my shoes shined repeatedly, and had haircuts. I asked questions and listened to people who provided these services. It is this part of my conversations that I found most interesting and most problematic.
The Arab people feel victimized, deprived of political, economic, cultural and civic privileges that accrued to a large segment of humanity. They have a great sense of history, and take pride in their role in it, and they feel deeply the indignity of the chasm that separates their present from their past. It is fair to say that the average Arab citizen perceives his government as a corrupt system of coercion and unshared privilege. The political and business elite is generally perceived to have sold out to the West, specifically to the US, and is incapable and unwilling to defend the national interest. As for those regimes that are in opposition to the West, their failure, and the suffering of their citizenry, is a reminder to the people of the worse alternative.
The past half a century has accumulated a record of crushing military defeats of several combinations of Arab States, and witnessed civil wars that yielded nothing but misery and bitterness in several countries. The frontal challenge to the Arab body politic, that of Israel and the question of Palestine, has never been met, and has remained the primary source of hostility toward the triangle of Arab Regimes, Israel and the United States. It has festered, unresolved, and is still at the core of disaffection and potential for tragedy.
Images on Al Jazira of civilian Palestinians subjected to the might of an army using sophisticated American weapons have flashed daily across the screens of tens of millions of Arab viewers for the past seventeen months. There is no sense in divorcing this context from the reaction of the Arab people after 9/11.
Political Islam, which has flexed its muscle in Shiite Iran in 1980, and claimed a military victory for the Sunnis in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in ‘89, appealed to the sense of injured dignity of the disaffected and hopeless youth. It has since replaced socialism, secularism and Arabism as the main force of opposition to all Arab regimes, and it has found its refuge in mosques and religious schools.
For the past couple of decades, the political space in the Arab World has reflected two major forces: the regimes and their State apparatus on the one hand, and political Islamic opposition on the other. The large middle ground is occupied by marginalized and reduced sectors of the society. These include the silenced secular, educated and enlightened class, as well as working people and the unemployed who did not turn to religious opposition.
The various reactions to the war on terrorism reflect the positions, or the perceptions, of these different constituents. One thing that they seem to have in common is a sense of bewilderment. This applies across the board to the regimes, the Islamic opposition and the silent majority and its constituents.
The regimes were initially bewildered at the audacity of the attack and the astounding failure of their most intrusive intelligence services. They are now bewildered to witness the relentless campaign in the American media against regimes friendly to America in the Arab World, blaming them for creating failed systems. These systems are accused of contributing to the insecurity rather than the security of the United States. The regimes feel that this campaign against them is orchestrated by pro- Israeli elements in the media and the Administration, anxious to deflect the blame for the anti- American feeling away from a foreign policy biased towards Israel. They view this as a serious attempt to block the pressure of these friendly regimes on the Administration to
resolve the Palestinian issue, and remove the central source of dissatisfaction amongst their own people.
Most of the regimes, from Egypt to Syria, and Yemen to Tunis, have long considered political Islam as a major security threat and have not worried much about the PR impact of their ruthless confrontation with it. The Saudis had tried to co-opt it as they exaggerated their adherence to Islamic strictures in order to blunt its impact. The new war on terrorism gets genuine and substantive support across the board from the regimes, as it presents serious public relations problems, to some more than others. There is cause for concern that some in those regimes may view the whole set of events since September 11, including their strained relations with the USA, as mostly a PR challenge to be met by PR solutions. Failure to correctly assess the impact of the policies they had adopted, and the internal dynamics that have contributed to the events, will preclude the emergence of measures needed to remold the systems.
The Islamists, after their initial flush of triumph and defiance, were bewildered at the quick disintegration of their power base in Afghanistan, the lack of support for their position, and the relentless dismantling of their global operations. Their vision to replace the existing nation state system by a single powerful Islamic state, that reclaims the glories of days gone by, laid in ruin. Their hopes, as expressed by Bin Laden, were to arouse Muslims against Christians and Jews whom he called infidels in direct contradiction to Islamic texts and tradition. This call failed to resonate in a culture that, despite contemporary wisdom of "experts" and pundits, has a long history of pluralism, tolerance and coexistence, and is resisting the pressure of
holy warriors. Their posing as champions of the Arab World's motherhood and apple pie cause of Palestine, and their appeal to the sense of victimization of the people, yielded an initial sympathy by some, only to give way to the by now much practiced sense of failure, desperation and blame. The only hope they have left is for the West, by words or by deeds, to appear to wage a war on Islam and the Arabs, rather than terrorism and terrorists.
The silent majority's multiple reactions also have the same theme in common: bewilderment. Let me set aside for a moment that segment of this majority that is purposefully silenced and weakened, and talk about the wide majority that has really never had a public voice but has always had an opinion: the proverbial Arab Street. This majority had in the main never heard of Al Qaida before, could not believe that any Arab or Muslim group could in fact mount such an attack, and continued to doubt it for a long time despite glaring evidence. This majority holds some common and simple views: disdain for the regimes, animosity towards Israel, and anger at the United States for supporting Israel. They sullenly watched T.V. images flashing across their living rooms of the Israeli military destroying Palestinian lives and property, and enforcing a policy of premeditated and purposeful humiliation, with visual brutality for all to see. This spectacle of violence went on for almost a year prior to September, and it heightened all their views and sentiments sometimes to the boiling point. It is disingenuous of us to deny that some Arabs and Muslims derived and expressed satisfaction from the attack on America. However, it would be erronious to think that the majority of the Arab people did not have a genuine sense of sympathy and shared human suffering with America and its victims. This majority understood America's
reaction, and its retaliation in Afghanistan against Al Qaida and the Taliban, but is now apprehensive about the future. It has not yielded to the Crusading Jihadi concept so violently pushed by Bin Laden, but it has genuine fears that some forces in the US share his views of the clash of civilizations and religions and is afraid that they might prevail. My conversations with the working poor in several Arab capitals have convinced me that there is mistrust, almost religious, of the intentions of those who want to fight this war against terrorism. Political decisions, whose ultimate objectives have to primarily include security, have to factor in the "swing vote" of this group and see to it that is not lost. In this context it is crucial to understand that words, words that precede deeds, said by high public officials, have to be weighed with a sense of history, and with great wisdom, for their disproportionate impact at this point in time. The colonial experience, the Palestinian problem, and the long record of broken Western promises to the Arab people argue against winning over the Arab street. But it is a street that can be won over, and will respond to goodwill. Despair, at this level, cannot enhance anyone's
security.
Let me move on to that subset of the silent majority that I think is most interesting, and perhaps offers the potential for a reconstruction that might help improve the dismal reality of the Arab World, and the whole Middle East. This subset is composed primarily of the middle and upper middle class, intellectuals, academicians, professionals and business people and the like. The kind of people who had identified with Gamal Abdul Nasser's vision of a united Arab world, secular and socialist that opposed Israel and its Western benefactors. Nasser and his vision were dealt a crushing blow in 1967, and these "nationalist" forces lost out to moderate or right wing regimes that actively weakened them and propped up Islamic forces to confront and discredit them.
The story of the past several decades is one of the ascendance of the Islamist forces, their relentless march to militancy, in opposition to the regimes that nurtured them, and to the West, especially America, that initially found common cause with them. Their gains were accomplished at the expense of the Arab nationalists who lost their voice and their bearing as a coherent force. The economic failure of the socialist, or the State- sponsored, economy, with corruption playing a strategic role in impeding development, has provided a significant constituency for a free and open economic system. One of the most significant developments in my opinion in the last several decades is that this very subset of society, endowed with competence and know-how, has been calling for more freedom, accountability, transparency and enfranchisement. There is a great deal of mutual suspicion between these people and the regimes, and they have yet to reap any serious benefit from these regimes.
Building bridges between this subset and the regimes, by expanding the circle of freedom, institution building, economic reform, and accountability is the most reasonable road to development and security. It certainly would go a long way in advancing regional and global security. The regimes have to understand the value of this alliance, and have to be nudged to understand, should they seek to maintain their opacity and inertia, the need to widen their base of support and improve their performance.
The Arabs are accused of wanting to focus the discussion on "root causes" of terrorism directed against America, a code word primarily for the Palestinian problem, with the implied criticism of American foreign policy. The Western media, on the other hand, tends to look into the internal dynamics of Arab and Muslim societies, including Islam itself as a religion, to understand or explain terrorism as a phenomenon. Both approaches need to be explored with care and without polemics.
There is a very serious concern for the Palestinians in having their cause linked in the American people's mind with September 11, and this explains the initial absence of discussion on this issue. However, it remains the elephant in the middle of the room, and will need to be discussed and addressed. It is the abscess in the body of the Arab World that has festered long enough and needs to be drained. It is the single most cause of antipathy to America in the Arab and Muslim world, where America the only super power, is perceived to be a lackey of Israel. Indeed no one over there seems to understand how the US can sacrifice its own interests so readily and consistently, not just to support Israel, but to maintain Israel's conquests and settlements. Visions and solutions offered, like the one stated in the November 19th speech by Secretary Powell, seem to offer glimpses of hope of political resolve that is quick to melt away. The alleged, even acknowledged incompetence, of the Palestinian leadership cannot be accepted in the Arab World as an excuse or explanation for the political, military, economic and media support that Israel receives lavishly from the United States as it maintains its occupation of the Palestinian people. To think that this does not engender hostility towards America is a mistake.
Too many players on the local scene can exercise their veto power to block solutions. There is enough genuine and claimed sense of victimization on both sides to render it impossible to achieve a lasting peace by the local parties. For so many months now we have witnessed the downward spiral of violence exploited to create yet more grief, and to maintain the occupation. The outline for peace is known to all of us, and Secretary Powell articulated it well. The excruciatingly painful arguments and nefarious deeds that frustrate the obvious land- for- peace equation have to be confronted with political courage. The United States, the only power in a position to help resolve this conflict, and develop the needed mechanisms for implementation, has been creative in finding arguments and reasons not to close the deal. It is perhaps time to be creative in the other direction for the sake of security and peace.
In the long run the war on terrorism will be won by depriving terrorists of their most important weapons: issues.
Ziad J. Asali, MD
Tuesday, Feb 19, 2002
The U.S. Campaign against terrorism:
Insights from the Arab World
Address by Dr. Ziad Asali
President, ADC
Given on February 19th, 2002 at the Middle East Institute
The history making, and policy defining, tragic events of September 11 have clearly had a more profound impact on the USA and the Arab Islamic World than on the rest of the world. The war on terrorism in Afghanistan is the first phase of a long, opaque and complex course of events that will define international relations for decades to come.
The Arab World is a huge stretch of land, with a most variegated population of over a quarter of a billion people, living in 25 States. It is part of the Islamic World that is populated by 1.2 billion people living in 55 States. No person in his right mind can make a generalization about the perceptions, policies and actions of such a large mass of humanity. I will, however, try to offer some insights, focus some attention on lurking dangers, and hope to explore some avenues that might help lead us out of the present predicament.
There is no historical precedent in the US for September 11. Pearl Harbor was directed against men in uniform. There is no exaggeration of the sense of violation and outrage of the American citizen after this crime, and all of us in this room will live with its consequences on the life of the nation and the world.
On September 11, four weeks after I assumed the presidency of the largest Arab- American grass roots organization, I found my organization and my community instantly in the eye of the storm. In another speech, on a different occasion, I would tell you about the sense of the Arab American community in this country after having visited 11 different cities to read it. In one word, that sense is of vulnerability.
I also visited the Arab World, crossing the Atlantic twice and visiting three different countries in the past few months. I talked to senior officials, journalists, academics and business people, watched TV, read the papers and participated in seminars. However, in order to make contact with the class that is not present at the discourse of the privileged, I took many cab rides, had my shoes shined repeatedly, and had haircuts. I asked questions and listened to people who provided these services. It is this part of my conversations that I found most interesting and most problematic.
The Arab people feel victimized, deprived of political, economic, cultural and civic privileges that accrued to a large segment of humanity. They have a great sense of history, and take pride in their role in it, and they feel deeply the indignity of the chasm that separates their present from their past. It is fair to say that the average Arab citizen perceives his government as a corrupt system of coercion and unshared privilege. The political and business elite is generally perceived to have sold out to the West, specifically to the US, and is incapable and unwilling to defend the national interest. As for those regimes that are in opposition to the West, their failure, and the suffering of their citizenry, is a reminder to the people of the worse alternative.
The past half a century has accumulated a record of crushing military defeats of several combinations of Arab States, and witnessed civil wars that yielded nothing but misery and bitterness in several countries. The frontal challenge to the Arab body politic, that of Israel and the question of Palestine, has never been met, and has remained the primary source of hostility toward the triangle of Arab Regimes, Israel and the United States. It has festered, unresolved, and is still at the core of disaffection and potential for tragedy.
Images on Al Jazira of civilian Palestinians subjected to the might of an army using sophisticated American weapons have flashed daily across the screens of tens of millions of Arab viewers for the past seventeen months. There is no sense in divorcing this context from the reaction of the Arab people after 9/11.
Political Islam, which has flexed its muscle in Shiite Iran in 1980, and claimed a military victory for the Sunnis in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in ‘89, appealed to the sense of injured dignity of the disaffected and hopeless youth. It has since replaced socialism, secularism and Arabism as the main force of opposition to all Arab regimes, and it has found its refuge in mosques and religious schools.
For the past couple of decades, the political space in the Arab World has reflected two major forces: the regimes and their State apparatus on the one hand, and political Islamic opposition on the other. The large middle ground is occupied by marginalized and reduced sectors of the society. These include the silenced secular, educated and enlightened class, as well as working people and the unemployed who did not turn to religious opposition.
The various reactions to the war on terrorism reflect the positions, or the perceptions, of these different constituents. One thing that they seem to have in common is a sense of bewilderment. This applies across the board to the regimes, the Islamic opposition and the silent majority and its constituents.
The regimes were initially bewildered at the audacity of the attack and the astounding failure of their most intrusive intelligence services. They are now bewildered to witness the relentless campaign in the American media against regimes friendly to America in the Arab World, blaming them for creating failed systems. These systems are accused of contributing to the insecurity rather than the security of the United States. The regimes feel that this campaign against them is orchestrated by pro- Israeli elements in the media and the Administration, anxious to deflect the blame for the anti- American feeling away from a foreign policy biased towards Israel. They view this as a serious attempt to block the pressure of these friendly regimes on the Administration to
resolve the Palestinian issue, and remove the central source of dissatisfaction amongst their own people.
Most of the regimes, from Egypt to Syria, and Yemen to Tunis, have long considered political Islam as a major security threat and have not worried much about the PR impact of their ruthless confrontation with it. The Saudis had tried to co-opt it as they exaggerated their adherence to Islamic strictures in order to blunt its impact. The new war on terrorism gets genuine and substantive support across the board from the regimes, as it presents serious public relations problems, to some more than others. There is cause for concern that some in those regimes may view the whole set of events since September 11, including their strained relations with the USA, as mostly a PR challenge to be met by PR solutions. Failure to correctly assess the impact of the policies they had adopted, and the internal dynamics that have contributed to the events, will preclude the emergence of measures needed to remold the systems.
The Islamists, after their initial flush of triumph and defiance, were bewildered at the quick disintegration of their power base in Afghanistan, the lack of support for their position, and the relentless dismantling of their global operations. Their vision to replace the existing nation state system by a single powerful Islamic state, that reclaims the glories of days gone by, laid in ruin. Their hopes, as expressed by Bin Laden, were to arouse Muslims against Christians and Jews whom he called infidels in direct contradiction to Islamic texts and tradition. This call failed to resonate in a culture that, despite contemporary wisdom of "experts" and pundits, has a long history of pluralism, tolerance and coexistence, and is resisting the pressure of
holy warriors. Their posing as champions of the Arab World's motherhood and apple pie cause of Palestine, and their appeal to the sense of victimization of the people, yielded an initial sympathy by some, only to give way to the by now much practiced sense of failure, desperation and blame. The only hope they have left is for the West, by words or by deeds, to appear to wage a war on Islam and the Arabs, rather than terrorism and terrorists.
The silent majority's multiple reactions also have the same theme in common: bewilderment. Let me set aside for a moment that segment of this majority that is purposefully silenced and weakened, and talk about the wide majority that has really never had a public voice but has always had an opinion: the proverbial Arab Street. This majority had in the main never heard of Al Qaida before, could not believe that any Arab or Muslim group could in fact mount such an attack, and continued to doubt it for a long time despite glaring evidence. This majority holds some common and simple views: disdain for the regimes, animosity towards Israel, and anger at the United States for supporting Israel. They sullenly watched T.V. images flashing across their living rooms of the Israeli military destroying Palestinian lives and property, and enforcing a policy of premeditated and purposeful humiliation, with visual brutality for all to see. This spectacle of violence went on for almost a year prior to September, and it heightened all their views and sentiments sometimes to the boiling point. It is disingenuous of us to deny that some Arabs and Muslims derived and expressed satisfaction from the attack on America. However, it would be erronious to think that the majority of the Arab people did not have a genuine sense of sympathy and shared human suffering with America and its victims. This majority understood America's
reaction, and its retaliation in Afghanistan against Al Qaida and the Taliban, but is now apprehensive about the future. It has not yielded to the Crusading Jihadi concept so violently pushed by Bin Laden, but it has genuine fears that some forces in the US share his views of the clash of civilizations and religions and is afraid that they might prevail. My conversations with the working poor in several Arab capitals have convinced me that there is mistrust, almost religious, of the intentions of those who want to fight this war against terrorism. Political decisions, whose ultimate objectives have to primarily include security, have to factor in the "swing vote" of this group and see to it that is not lost. In this context it is crucial to understand that words, words that precede deeds, said by high public officials, have to be weighed with a sense of history, and with great wisdom, for their disproportionate impact at this point in time. The colonial experience, the Palestinian problem, and the long record of broken Western promises to the Arab people argue against winning over the Arab street. But it is a street that can be won over, and will respond to goodwill. Despair, at this level, cannot enhance anyone's
security.
Let me move on to that subset of the silent majority that I think is most interesting, and perhaps offers the potential for a reconstruction that might help improve the dismal reality of the Arab World, and the whole Middle East. This subset is composed primarily of the middle and upper middle class, intellectuals, academicians, professionals and business people and the like. The kind of people who had identified with Gamal Abdul Nasser's vision of a united Arab world, secular and socialist that opposed Israel and its Western benefactors. Nasser and his vision were dealt a crushing blow in 1967, and these "nationalist" forces lost out to moderate or right wing regimes that actively weakened them and propped up Islamic forces to confront and discredit them.
The story of the past several decades is one of the ascendance of the Islamist forces, their relentless march to militancy, in opposition to the regimes that nurtured them, and to the West, especially America, that initially found common cause with them. Their gains were accomplished at the expense of the Arab nationalists who lost their voice and their bearing as a coherent force. The economic failure of the socialist, or the State- sponsored, economy, with corruption playing a strategic role in impeding development, has provided a significant constituency for a free and open economic system. One of the most significant developments in my opinion in the last several decades is that this very subset of society, endowed with competence and know-how, has been calling for more freedom, accountability, transparency and enfranchisement. There is a great deal of mutual suspicion between these people and the regimes, and they have yet to reap any serious benefit from these regimes.
Building bridges between this subset and the regimes, by expanding the circle of freedom, institution building, economic reform, and accountability is the most reasonable road to development and security. It certainly would go a long way in advancing regional and global security. The regimes have to understand the value of this alliance, and have to be nudged to understand, should they seek to maintain their opacity and inertia, the need to widen their base of support and improve their performance.
The Arabs are accused of wanting to focus the discussion on "root causes" of terrorism directed against America, a code word primarily for the Palestinian problem, with the implied criticism of American foreign policy. The Western media, on the other hand, tends to look into the internal dynamics of Arab and Muslim societies, including Islam itself as a religion, to understand or explain terrorism as a phenomenon. Both approaches need to be explored with care and without polemics.
There is a very serious concern for the Palestinians in having their cause linked in the American people's mind with September 11, and this explains the initial absence of discussion on this issue. However, it remains the elephant in the middle of the room, and will need to be discussed and addressed. It is the abscess in the body of the Arab World that has festered long enough and needs to be drained. It is the single most cause of antipathy to America in the Arab and Muslim world, where America the only super power, is perceived to be a lackey of Israel. Indeed no one over there seems to understand how the US can sacrifice its own interests so readily and consistently, not just to support Israel, but to maintain Israel's conquests and settlements. Visions and solutions offered, like the one stated in the November 19th speech by Secretary Powell, seem to offer glimpses of hope of political resolve that is quick to melt away. The alleged, even acknowledged incompetence, of the Palestinian leadership cannot be accepted in the Arab World as an excuse or explanation for the political, military, economic and media support that Israel receives lavishly from the United States as it maintains its occupation of the Palestinian people. To think that this does not engender hostility towards America is a mistake.
Too many players on the local scene can exercise their veto power to block solutions. There is enough genuine and claimed sense of victimization on both sides to render it impossible to achieve a lasting peace by the local parties. For so many months now we have witnessed the downward spiral of violence exploited to create yet more grief, and to maintain the occupation. The outline for peace is known to all of us, and Secretary Powell articulated it well. The excruciatingly painful arguments and nefarious deeds that frustrate the obvious land- for- peace equation have to be confronted with political courage. The United States, the only power in a position to help resolve this conflict, and develop the needed mechanisms for implementation, has been creative in finding arguments and reasons not to close the deal. It is perhaps time to be creative in the other direction for the sake of security and peace.
In the long run the war on terrorism will be won by depriving terrorists of their most important weapons: issues.
Ziad J. Asali, MD
Tuesday, Feb 19, 2002
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Permission to reproduce this lecture in full was kindly granted by the American Arab Anti-Defamation Committee.
Go to:
www.adc.org
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